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ABSTRACT
This paper reports the results of an ESA funded project 
on the use of abstract interpretation to validate critical 
real-time   embedded   space   software.   Abstract 
interpretation is industrially used since several years, 
especially for the validation of the Ariane 5 launcher. 
However,   the   limitations   of   the   tools   used   so   far 
prevented   a   wider   deployment.   Astrium   Space 
Transportation,   CEA,   and   ENS   have   analyzed   the 
performances   of  two  recent   tools  on   a  case  study 
extracted from the safety software of the ATV:
- ASTRÉE, developed by ENS and CNRS, to check 
for run-time errors,
- FLUCTUAT, developed by CEA, to analyse the 
accuracy of numerical computations.
The conclusion of the study is that the performance of 
this new generation of tools has dramatically increased 
(no   false   alarms   and   fine   analysis   of   numerical 
precision).
1. INTRODUCTION
As recent NASA mission failures illustrate, any single 
error   in   critical   software   can   have   catastrophic 
consequences. More than half of all satellite failures 
from 2000 to 2003 involved software. Even though 
failures are usually not advertised, some software bugs 
have become famous, such as the error in the MIM-104 
Patriot. 
One   use   of   abstract   interpretation   techniques   is   to 
improve the confidence and reduce the cost of software 
validation. Software validation is a difficult and costly 
activity   representing   more   than   half   of   the   total 
development   cost.   Software   validation   is   the   last 
development step, but, unfortunately, testing and code 
review, the most widely deployed verification methods, 
suffer from severe shortcomings. Both methods are very 
time consuming and labour intensive processes. For 
most critical systems, 50% of the overall development 
costs are allocated to testing. In fact, it is not practically 
feasible to hunt down to the last bug. In short, as E. W. 
Dijkstra puts it: Program testing can be a very effective 
way to show the presence of bugs, but is hopelessly 
inadequate for showing their absence. 
One of the most promising technical axes practised 
since several years by ASTRIUM is the use of static 
analysis [3]. INRIA has developed around 1993 a tool, 
IABC,   based on academic studies to detect run-time 
errors (e.g., arrays out of bound, overflow, zero divide, 
etc.); this tool has then been scaled for Ariane 5 ADA 
products, and industrialized by Polyspace Technologies 
during the following years (now The MathWorks). This 
tool has provided some good help at that time and is still 
in use for all critical software developed by ASTRIUM-
ST. 
But with this first generation of abstract interpretation-
based static analysis tools, it remains difficult (indeed 
impossible) to avoid false alarms with floating-point 
operations and iterative algorithms. So, the use of these 
techniques which was planned for the development of 
the ATV safety software (MSU software), has been 
finally abandoned due to the high number of false 
alarms raised by the tool on floating-point operations. 
  "Space   Software   Validation   using   Abstract 
Interpretation" (SSVAI) is an ESA project which had 
the   objective   to   investigate   the   use   of   abstract 
interpretation-based   static   analysis   techniques   to 
improve   the   validation   of   space   critical   embedded 
software applied to numerical algorithms for which 
other tools have not provided satisfactory results. 
Two tools have been studied:
- ASTRÉE: Analyse Statique de logiciels Temps-
RÉel   Embarqués   (Static   Analysis   of  Real-Time 
Embedded Software) [1,4]. This tool, developed by 
the École Normale Supérieure and the CNRS, aims 
at automatically proving the absence of run-time 
errors, such as division by zero, out of range array 
indexes, arithmetic overflows, etc.
- FLUCTUAT: This tool, developed by the CEA, 
aims   at   analysing   the   numerical   precision   and 
stability of complex algorithms [5].
2. WHAT IS ABSTRACT INTERPRETATION? 
The   formal   verification   of   a   program   (and   more 
generally a computer system) consists in proving that its semantics (describing "what the program executions 
actually do") satisfies its specification (describing "what 
the program executions are supposed to do"). 
Abstract Interpretation [3] formalizes the idea that this 
formal proof can be done at some level of abstraction 
where irrelevant details about the semantics and the 
specification are ignored. This amounts to proving that 
an abstract semantics satisfies an abstract specification. 
Abstractions shall be sound (no conclusion derived from 
the abstract semantics is wrong relative to the program 
concrete   semantics   and   specification).   Abstractions 
should also preferably be complete (no aspect of the 
semantics relevant to the specification is left out). In the 
considered   applications,   which   tackle   undecidable 
program properties, completeness is impossible. Hence, 
the objective is to minimize false alarms on a specific 
family of programs while keeping a reasonable analysis 
cost.
Abstract interpretation can be applied to the systematic 
construction of methods and effective algorithms to 
approximate undecidable or very complex problems in 
computer science such that the semantics, the proof, the 
static   analysis,   the   verification,   the   safety   and   the 
security of software or hardware computer systems. In 
particular,   static   analysis   by   abstract   interpretation, 
which   automatically   infers   dynamic   properties   of 
computer systems, has been very successful these last 
years to automatically verify complex properties of real-
time, safety-critical embedded systems. 
Verifying   the   software   specification   of   numerical 
algorithms including iterative loops is considered a 
difficult problem. Formal specifications usually do not 
exist but implicit specifications can be used, such as the 
absence   of  run-time  errors   (overflows,   etc.)  or  the 
stability   of   numerical   computations.   Due   to 
undecidability   issues,   complete   tools   are   generally 
impossible to design and tools may fail to prove (part 
of) the specification. Soundness dictates that the tools 
raise alarms to signal  all  potential violations of the 
specification. A spurious alarm reported by the tool 
when the specification is not actually violated is called a 
false alarm.
However, static analysis tools producing very few or no 
false alarms have been designed and used in industrial 
contexts   for   specific   families   of   properties   and 
programs. In all cases, abstract interpretation provides a 
systematic construction method based on the effective 
approximation of the concrete semantics, which can be 
(partly) automated and/or formally verified. 
When dealing with undecidable questions on program 
execution, the verification problem must reconcile: 
- correctness   (which   excludes   non   exhaustive 
methods such as simulation, test, bounded model 
checking, or syntactic pattern-matching), 
- automation (which excludes model checking with 
manual   production   of   a   program   model   and 
deductive methods where provers must be manually 
assisted), 
- precision (which excludes general analysers which 
would produce too many false alarms, i.e., spurious 
warnings about potential errors), 
- scalability (for software of a few hundred thousand 
lines), 
- efficiency   (with   minimal   space   and   time 
requirements allowing for rapid verification during 
the software production process which excludes a 
costly iterative refinement process).
3. RESULTS OF THE PROJECT 
3.1. Scope 
The   programs   studied   in   this   project   have   been 
automatically generated using proprietary tools familiar 
to control engineers (such as MATLAB/SIMULINK or 
SCADE)   from   high-level   specifications   (such   as 
systems   of   differential   equations   or   synchronous 
operator building blocks, which is equivalent to the use 
of synchronous languages like Lustre). 
Such synchronous data flow specifications are quite 
common   in   real-time   safety-critical   control   systems 
developed   for   on-board   flight   software.   Periodic 
synchronous programming perfectly matches the need 
for the real-time integration of differential equations by 
forward fixed step numerical methods. The verification 
tools shall cope with this family of programs and the 
current status is the following:
- The Polyspace Verifier tool (The MathWorks) is 
currently   used   at   Astrium   SAS   BU   Space 
Transportation and other space industry but has 
shown some strong limitations. In fact, in order to 
limit the number of false alarms raised, the analysis 
of   floating-point   number   overflows   had   to   be 
disabled,  which makes  the approach  much  less 
interesting. 
- The ASTRÉE tool [1,4] (studied in this project) is a 
static   program   analyzer   aiming   at   proving   the 
absence   of   run-time   errors   (RTE)   in   programs 
written in the C programming language. ASTRÉE 
uses   generalist   abstractions   (intervals,   octagons, 
etc.) and specific abstractions which have been 
designed   for  the  application domain  (to handle 
filters, integrators, etc.). The proof that the software 
satisfies the implicit specification (absence of RTE) 
is  mathematically  valid since it is made for  a 
superset of all possible program behaviors and all 
possible execution environments. However some 
executions in the over-approximations can lead to 
false alarms that do not correspond to an actual 
concrete execution. The whole difficulty of the 
undecidable problem of software verification is to 
chose   sound   over-approximations   without   false 
alarms   (by   soundness,   no   true   error   can   be 
forgotten). ASTRÉE has been used successfully on the flight control software of the AIRBUS A340 
and A380 [2] where it raised no false alarms, even 
for complex computations involving floating-point 
numbers. In the case of ASTRÉE, the programs to 
be   analysed   are   real-time   synchronous   control-
command applications. 
- The FLUCTUAT  tool [5] (also  studied in this 
project)   is   an   abstract   interpretation   tool   for 
studying numerical programs coded in C, and in 
particular   the   propagation   of   uncertainties   in 
floating-point computations. Its aim is to detect 
automatically   a   possible   catastrophic   loss   of 
precision and its source, or else prove its absence. It 
relies on abstract domains for the estimation of 
values and errors,  based on interval and affine 
arithmetic (with zonotopic concretization).
o A   language   of   assertions   helps 
specifying  the range of inputs and 
initial uncertainties. The tool delivers, 
for   each   scalar   variable   of   the 
analyzed   program,   ranges   for   the 
value   that   variables   would   take   if 
computed with an idealized semantics 
in   real   numbers,   ranges   for   the 
machine   values   (floating-point   or 
integer),   and   ranges   for   the   error 
between the idealized and the machine 
semantics,   decomposed   by 
contribution from each line of code. 
The   tool   produces   a   graphical 
representation of the source of each 
numerical precision loss. It allows the 
user to know quickly the lines in the C 
source code causing the biggest losses 
of numerical precision.
o For   loops,   the  tool   also   allows   to 
produce   graphics   representing   the 
evolution of bounds for the values and 
errors   of   variables   during   the 
computation.   This   is   an   important 
feature for real-time systems,  as it 
allows understanding the evolution of 
the   numerical   precision   during   the 
duration of the software execution. 
o Finally, it can also deliver information 
about   the   sensitivity   of  a   code   to 
initial errors.
A problem of numerical instability of the same kind 
as those that can be detected by FLUCTUAT had 
been discovered in the navigation algorithm of the 
MSU Software. But, due to a difference of precision 
between the host machine used for the algorithm 
validation and the target machine, this bug was 
detected   very   late,   in   the   last   stage   of   target 
validation.
3.2. Case study
A  representative   piece  of  space   software   has   been 
provided by ASTRIUM ST in order to be used for the 
assessment of the ASTRÉE and FLUCTUAT tools. This 
case study is based on the on-board software of the 
Monitoring and Safing Unit (MSU) of the ATV space 
vehicle. The following criteria have been used to select 
the case study:
- The case study is representative of the complexity 
of software developed by ASTRIUM ST. The MSU 
SW   comprises   a   simple   GNC   (Guidance, 
Navigation, Control), but fully representative of the 
numerical algorithms developed at ASTRIUM ST. 
The mission management part of the MSU SW is 
less   representative   of   ASTRIUM   ST   Software 
development, but the study focuses on numerical 
algorithms. 
- The case study is small enough to be manageable 
during a R&T study. 
- The case study is available in C (even though the 
operational version has been developed in ADA, 
several C versions of the MSU SW exist). 
The MSU SW contains mainly: 
- Navigation   and   Control   algorithms   (i.e.,   GNC 
without Guidance), 
- a simplified mission management (composed of one 
state automaton and of a plan sequence).
The Technical Specification of the MSU SW is based 
on a SCADE model. This model covers the high level 
software architecture, the mission management, and the 
architecture of the control and of the navigation. The 
flight version of the MSU SW has then been designed 
and developed in ADA. For the needs of several R&T 
projects, two versions of the MSU Software have been 
developed,   respectively   in   SCADE   V5   and   in 
SIMULINK, which can generate C code. The code of 
this case study has then not been developed with the 
usual   level   of   quality   of   operational   projects   of 
ASTRIUM-ST. 
The analysis of the SIMULINK models has failed due 
to the optimization of the C code generated by RTW-
EC. Thus, this version of the case study was abandoned 
and the work has focused on the SCADE models. These 
SCADE models have been updated to SCADE V6 (last 
version of the editor and code generator available since 
October 2007). Several C code generation options of 
SCADE 6 have been tested (not expanded or expanded 
with several optimization levels) in order to complete 
the assessment of ASTRÉE and FLUCTUAT.3.3. Usability   of   abstract   interpretation-based 
static analysis tools in space domain 
3.3.1. Exhaustive detection of run-time errors with 
ASTRÉE 
Software   verification   consists   in   proving   that   all 
executions of a program satisfy a specification. In the 
case of the ASTRÉE [1,4], the specification is implicit: 
no   execution   should   lead   to   a   run-time   error   or 
undesirable behavior (out of range index, division by 
zero,   dangling   pointer,   numeric   overflow,   etc.). 
ASTRÉE can also check some user-defined assertions 
(such as variables staying within user-specified ranges).
This study has shown that ASTRÉE is well adapted to 
the C code generated from SCADE V6 and to manual C 
code, but it is less efficient on C code generated from 
SIMULINK. It cannot analyse C++ nor ADA code. 
On the proposed case study, the tool has allowed to 
detect and correct several bugs: incorrect access to an 
array, incorrect numerical protection, and incorrect use 
of memory copies (due to bugs in the experimental 
SCADE  KCG tool  when  generating   non  optimized 
code). 
To   obtain   the   first   analysis   results,   the   following 
activities were performed:
- Definition   of   a   specific   library   which   can   be 
parameterized for both run-time error analysis or 
embedded   code generation.   This  library  defines 
trigonometric,   vector,   matrix,   and   quaternion 
computations,   as   well   as   the   square   root   and 
memory copy operations. This library has been 
developed in the scope of this project and can be 
reused in any analysis of similar space software. It 
may however have to be completed to more specific 
needs. 
- Experimentation with the various SCADE KCG 
code   generator   options   to   discover   which   ones 
provide optimal analysis speed and precision (e.g., 
the analysis precision depends on how boolean 
operations are compiled, it is faster when optimized 
code is generated, etc.). These settings are generic 
and can be reused on any analysis of similar space 
software. 
- Definition and formalization of properties on the 
execution environment (e.g., acceptable values of 
input   or   maximum   run   time)   to   ensure   the 
exhaustive   data   coverage   of   the   analysis.   This 
activity has to be performed for each project.
Then, in order to ensure a minimal number of alarms, 
the following actions were performed:
- Addition   of   a   minimal   number   of   numerical 
protections. The soundness of the tool ensures that 
no protection has been forgotten. In many cases, the 
tool can prove that no protection is necessary, thus 
greatly reducing the number of useless protections 
to insert (and these should be avoided as they have 
a negative impact on the efficiency of the code).
- Addition   of   known   facts,   that   is,   user-defined 
predicates   that   the   tool   assumes   correct.   The 
correctness of these known facts comes from a 
manual analysis or an analysis by the FLUCTUAT 
tool. The use of known facts could be avoided by 
extending   ASTRÉE   with   domain-specific 
abstractions (such work was performed for avionics 
software, hence ASTRÉE's ability to reach zero 
false alarms on AIRBUS code without the need for 
any known fact; moreover, after the end of the 
SSVAI project, ASTRÉE has been extended with 
abstractions specific to quaternion computations, 
which reduces the need for known facts on the case 
study   considered   here).After   these   additions, 
ASTRÉE outputs 0 false alarms. Moreover, the 
analysis is extremely efficient: the 8 KLOC (lines 
before   preprocessing   of   C   code   generated   by 
SCADE   KCG   V6   in   non-expanded   and   O3 
optimized mode) control  part of the case study is 
analyzed in 2mn30s on a 64-bit laptop PC while the 
6 KLOC navigation part is analyzed in 1mn40s.
Even if additional work would be useful in order to 
improve the precision of ASTRÉE analysis on some 
specific features such as the handling of Kalman filters 
(e.g., to reduce the need for known facts), the ASTRÉE 
tool can clearly be used on this and any similar critical 
real-time embedded space software.
3.3.2. Analysis of numerical stability of algorithms 
with FLUCTUAT
This   study   has   shown   that   FLUCTUAT   [5]   is 
compatible with C code generated from SCADE V5 (V6 
has not been tested) and with manual C code but it is 
less efficient on C code generated from SIMULINK and 
is not compatible with C++ and ADA. 
The tool has shown the following on the MSU code:
- The   full   code   (38246   LoC,   expanded   inlined 
SCADE V5 generated C code) has been analyzed, 
under some restrictive hypotheses, and proved to 
behave well numerically.
- The ranges of the output of some critical functions 
of   the   MSU   which   were   studied   in   internal 
specification   documents   of   Astrium   have   been 
confirmed   automatically   by   FLUCTUAT. 
FLUCTUAT also gave bounds on the imprecision 
errors   for   those   functions   that   could   not   be 
computed by hand, hence were not detailed in these 
internal documents.
- The stability of a 8-th order filter  (used to filter 
accelerations in the main control mechanism of the 
MSU software) has been proved automatically. The 
ranges of the output ([−14.07, 14.07]), both on real 
numbers and floating point numbers, found by the 
tool, with full loop unfolding, correspond to the 
expected theoretical ranges, as specified in internal Astrium documents (inputs within [-10,10] and a 
gain equal to 1.4). Imprecision errors were shown to 
be negligible (the global error lies in [−5.45 10
−5, 
5.45   10
−5]   for   simple   precision   floating   point 
numbers).
The 8
th order filter is made with 4 connected cells of 
order 2, Fluctuat shows that the biggest error comes 
from the third cell of order 2 (Fig. 1).
Test cases were automatically produced by the tool 
to derive "worst-case" scenarios  for values and 
errors.   The   two   sequences   are   different   (the 
maximal error is not related to the maximal value) 
and hard to derive manually (Fig. 2).
For simple precision floating point numbers, the 
output   of   the   filter   was   proved   to   be   within 
[−14.0754471, 14.0754471], and the global error 
within   [−5.454328   10
-5,   5.454328   10
-5].   The 
maximal value reached was 14.0754108, its related 
global   error   was   bounded   by   1.15896   10
−6. 
However, the maximal error reached was 7.22078 
10
−6 (Fig. 3) and its related value was −1.17364860.
The   current   version   of   Fluctuat   embeds 
improvements of the abstract domain [6] made after 
the ATV case study. The tool is able to derive a 
tight invariant of the former filter ([-15.97, 15.97]).
- The prediction part of the Kalman filter, heart of the 
control mechanism, relies on two 4-th order Runge-
Kutta (RK4) integrations.
Here, two different kinds of errors are of interest: 
the   imprecision   error   due   to   the   use   of   finite 
precision numbers and “functional” errors related to 
the   integration   scheme   used   to   solve   ordinary 
differential equations (ODE).
For the first kind, that is, the imprecision error, 
Fluctuat shows that the main contribution to the 
global   error   on   the   acceleration   command   ac[] 
comes from the representation in floating point 
numbers of integration steps (0.075 and 0.925 in 
real numbers). For example, in Fig. 4, one can see 
that the representation of 0.925 introduces an error 
of 1.06 10
-10 on variable ac[1] which value is 2.60 
10
-6. This corresponds to a non negligible relative 
error of 4 10
-5.
For the functional error, we have used an external 
guaranteed integrator, GRKLib [7], to estimate the 
difference between the values given by a guaranteed 
integration   of   ODEs   modelling   the   physical 
environment and the values given by Fluctuat on 
Fig  2: Sequences that derive the maximal value(gray 
line) and the maximal global error(black line)
Fig. 1: Biggest contribution to the global error comes 
from the transfer function of the third cell
Fig. 3: Evolution of the error function of the sequence 
leading to the maximal error
Fig. 4: Contribution of the integration step to the global 
errorthe implementation of the prediction part of the 
MSU Software. We have found that the relative 
discrepancy is around 18%, which means that the 
integration   scheme   used   is   rather   imprecise. 
However, comparative analyses showed that the 
choice of an RK4 integration algorithm (with these 
large integration steps) was better than simpler 
Euler-like   integration   algorithms   (with   smaller 
integration steps – for instance 0.1 and 0.01). 
After the end of the SSVAI project, the whole Kalman 
filter (and not only its prediction part) has been analysed 
with HybridFluctuat [8] (Fluctuat tool enhanced with a 
guaranteed   integrator),   to   analyse   the   difference 
between the real position of the ATV, given by sensors 
(over approximated by the guaranteed integrator), and 
the estimation of this position given by the software 
(implementation of the Kalman filter) : the discrepancy 
was found to be around 5% [8].
All these features made the tool very practical and very 
efficient to better understand the numerical behavior of 
the system under analysis. 
This study has also shown that space software is much 
more difficult to analyze than aeronautic software due to 
the   important   number   of   non   linear   computations, 
especially with quaternions (most software from the 
aeronautics   industry   that   have   been   analyzed   by 
FLUCTUAT were using linear computations, except for 
some specific and isolated functions).
4. CONCLUSION 
The ASTRÉE  [1,4] and  FLUCTUAT  [5] tools are 
applicable to any embedded space software developed 
manually in C. They can also analyze C code generated 
from SCADE models but they are less efficient on C 
code generated from SIMULINK models and cannot 
analyze other programming languages such as C++, 
ADA, or Java, which is an important restriction. 
This study has shown that embedded space software are 
difficult to analyze due to non linearity (mainly in 
quaternion   computations)   and   complex   control 
command   algorithms   involved   (e.g.,   Kalman   filter). 
ASTRÉE can be extended to handle this by designing 
new specific abstract domains. Some progress was made 
after the end of the project through the addition of a new 
domain   specialized   in   the   analysis   of   quaternion 
computations.   The   architecture   (concerning   the 
activation   conditions)   of   the   software   has   also   an 
important impact on the efficiency of the analyses. But 
it should be noticed that the software architecture which 
suits static analysis by abstract interpretation best is also 
the more  readable   one and   maintainable  one.  This 
technique can thus be a metrics of good architectures. 
In   spite  of   these   difficulties,   abstract   interpretation 
techniques can greatly improve the quality of space 
embedded software:
- ASTRÉE has allowed correcting bugs in the case 
study, 
- the number of remaining false alarms is equal to 
zero (compared to several hundred of remaining 
false alarms for an analysis with Polyspace Verifier) 
- FLUCTUAT has confirmed some manual analyses 
performed on the MSU software, 
- FLUCTUAT has delivered results on global errors 
which were not manually achievable, 
- the tools are complementary: they prove different 
properties   and   may  be  used   together   (e.g.,  the 
ranges found by a global analysis by ASTRÉE can 
be used as input by FLUCTUAT to study the 
relative precision of a given numeric computation; 
on the other hand, properties proved with the help 
of FLUCTUAT can be inserted as known facts in 
code analyzed by ASTRÉE),
- a process of use has been defined for both tools.
Thanks to a case study representative of the software 
developed at ASTRIUM ST, the results of this study 
will be applicable to any type of embedded critical real-
time space software (launchers, satellites, spacecrafts, 
and space probes) developed in C. They will improve 
the quality of software (fewer residual bugs) and will at 
the   same   time   dramatically   decrease   the   cost   of 
robustness testing. 
The study has also hinted towards some directions of 
improvement for the tools.
As   a   conclusion,   the   Technology   Readiness   Level 
(TRL) for ASTRÉE and FLUCTUAT on space software 
is evaluated between 4 (component and/or breadboard 
validation in laboratory environment) and 5 (component 
and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment).
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